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Case No. 20110879
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff / Appellee,
vs.
ECHO MARNE KURR,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction of retail theft with prior convictions,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602 (West 2010).
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
1. Was trial counsel constitutionally ineffective for not getting an
eyewitness identification expert or asking for a Long instruction where the jury
viewed multiple clips of video footage showing Defendant stealing a
sweatshirt?
Standard of Review. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for
the first time on appeal presents a question of law which this Court reviews for
correctness. State v. Towers, 2011 UT App 383, \ 15, 265 P.3d 832.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
No interpretation of constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules is
determinative of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged Defendant with one count of retail theft with prior
convictions, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602
(West 2010). Rl. A magistrate bound the case over for trial after hearing
testimony from a loss prevention employee who watched Defendant via closed
circuit television mill around Sears for 10-15 minutes before stealing a
sweatshirt. The employee confronted her in the parking lot and later identified
her in a photo lineup and at the preliminary hearing. R60:4-16.
After viewing clips of the closed circuit recording, the jury convicted
Defendant as charged. The court sentenced her to 200 days jail and zerotolerance probation, R43, 64:9. Defendant timely appealed. R53.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Chad Wise and Victor Garcia worked at the Ogden Sears as loss
prevention officers.

R63:14, 45. Their job was to look out for and stop

shoplifters. Id. at 15. just before 7:00 p.m. on November 9,2010, they found one.
While watching the store through closed-circuit security cameras, they saw a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
-2-may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

blonde woman wearing a brown sweatshirt (Defendant) carrying a large bag
that appeared to be empty. Id. at 15-16; State's Exh. 1-4. The empty bag was an
"alert signal" to them, so they tracked her around the store. Chad followed her
using security cameras, Victor followed her on foot, and the two coordinated
their surveillance via two-way radio. R63:16-17, 52-53. The cameras allowed
Chad to pan, tilt, and zoom in on Defendant's face a number of times. See id. at
26, State's Exh. 1. Both clips of the video surveillance and th ree photo stills from
the surveillance were admitted at trial. State's Exh. 1-4. Though the photo stills
did not provide much detail of Defendant's face, the video clips did. See State's
Exh. 1 at 18:52:58-18:52:47; 18:53:18-36; 18:54:30; 18:54:34-45; 18:54:59; 18:55:18;
18:55:30
Defendant took a sweatshirt and left the store without paying for it.
R63:25-30. Chad and Victor confronted her about it in the parking lot. Chad
was about fifteen yards away from her, and Victor was within arm's length. Id.
at 31,56-57. Though it was dark, they could see her clearly. Id. at 31,56-57. She
refused to talk with them about the theft, threw the sweatshirt at Victor, and
drove away in a white car. Id. at 33,57-60. Victor wrote down the license plate
and Chad gave it to police. Id. at 33, 65.
The police ran the license plate, which came back to a white Nissan
Altima registered to Defendant. Id. at 65. A detective put Defendant's photo
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with five others in a lineup and showed it to Chad, who "immediately" picked
out Defendant as the shoplifter. Id. at 66. Both Chad and Victor identified
Defendant at trial as the shoplifter. Id. at 32,56-57.
Faced with this evidence, defense counsel's strategy was to focus on the
State's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Counsel noted that
there was a gap in the video clips during which, he argued, Defendant could
have paid for the sweatshirt. R63:83-84. He also noted that one of the State's
witnesses, Victor Garcia, was unknown to the investigating officer, which
counsel implied cast doubt on the credibility of the State's witnesses. Id. at 8283.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: Trial counsel did not perform deficiently by not hiring an
eyewitness identification expert or requesting a Long instruction because the
jury could plainly identify Defendant from a surveillance video that zoomed in
on her face numerous times as she committed the theft. It would not have been
reasonable to do so under the circumstances. And even if counsel had called an
expert, requested a Long instruction, or done both, it would have made no
difference in the result.
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ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY
INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT CHALLENGING EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION EITHER BY EXPERT, JURY INSTRUCTION,
OR BOTH, BECAUSE THE JURY SAW BOTH VIDEO
SURVEILLANCE AND STILL PHOTOS OF DEFENDANT
Defendant claims that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not
calling an eyewitness identification expert or requesting a Long instruction (i.e.,
a jury instruction outlining the weaknesses of eyewitness identification). Aplt.
Br. at 7; See State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). This claim is frivolous
because Defendant was caught stealing on video, and portions of this video
were admitted at trial.1
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant bears the burden
of proving (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Establishing deficient performance requires the defendant to identify
specific acts or omissions that fall outside the wide range of reasonable
professional judgment. Id. at 687-88. An appellate court "must indulge a strong

1

Defendant wrongly asserts that "the-person [in the video] [was] never
actually referred to as the defendant." Aplt. Br. at 19. Both Chad and Victor
identified Defendant as the woman in the video that they later confronted in the
parking lot. R63:32, 55-57.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound
trial strategy/" Id. at 689 (citation omitted).
This standard is appropriately deferential, recognizing the 'Variety of
circumstances faced by defense counsel" and "the range of legitimate decisions
regarding how to best represent a criminal defendant." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d
1250,1254 (Utah 1993). This deference also recognizes that, "[u]nlike a later
reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew of
materials outside the record, and interacted with the client, with opposing
counsel, and with the judge." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011).
Thus, any conceivable tactical basis for trial counsel's actions defeats a claim of
deficient performance. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 7, 89 P.3d 162; State v.
Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, f 58, 61 P.3d 291. Because he bears the burden,
Defendant must "persuad[e] the court that there was no conceivable tactical
basis for counsel's actions." Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6 (emphasis in original)
(quotations and citation omitted). Effective assistance does not require that
counsel pursue a strategy simply because there is nothing to lose by it. See
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. I l l (2009).
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In short , Defend? •

•

;

-.jmonstrate that ''com i sel made erroi s so

serious that counsel was not fi iiictioning as the counsel guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment/' Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 787 (quotations
and citation omitted).
Establishing prejudice requires the defendant to show that " there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different." Id, at 694; see also State v. Chacon,
962 P.2d 48,50 (I Jtah 1998). A reasonable probability is a probability "sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome. It is not enough to show that the
errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Counsel's
errors must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable." Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 787-88 (quotations and citation
omitted). Proof of prejudice must be based on a "demonstrable reality and not a
speculative matter." Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50.
Defendant has not shown deficient performance for two reasons. First,
she has put forth no proof that the decision was unreasonable under the
circumstances of this case. Although Defendant complained of her attorney's
representation at sentencing, she never called her trial counsel to testify about
his reasons for not calling an expert and never requested a rule 23B remand on
appeal to supplement the record with evidence in support of her claims. See
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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R64:4-6. When a defendant fails to create an adequate record on appeal, this
Court assumes that the record supports counsel's decision.

See State v.

Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f t 16-17,12 P.3d 92. Defendant's deficient performance
claim fails on this basis alone.
Second, counsel's decision not to call an eyewitness identification expert
was clearly reasonable because the jury saw the video clips and stills, as well as
heard testimony that the getaway car was registered to her. See State's Exh. 1-4;
R63:33, 65. It would have been a waste of time to contest identification where
the jury saw the video and could compare it to Defendant in person. Indeed,
counsel would have likely lost all credibility with the jury by challenging
eyewitness identifications that were supported by uncontestable proof of her
identity.2 The only strategy reasonably available to the defense was the one
counsel took: to emphasize the State's burden of proof and call into question
whether the State had met it on points other than identity. See R63:81-84; see,
e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.19 (1984) ("Of course, the Sixth
Amendment does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If

2

Defendant claims some doubt about whether she was the person in the
video clips and stills. Aplt. Br. at 19-20. The record belies this claim. See R63:32,
35, 55-57. But even if there were any ambiguity, deficiencies in the record are
construed in favor of counsel's decision. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f f 16-17.
Tellingly, Defendant never claims she was not the person in the video or leaving
in her car.
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there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may
disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade. At the same
time, even when no theory of defense is available, if the decision to stand trial
has been made, counsel must hold the prosecution to its heavy burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.")
i

• .

But even if there were no conceivable strategic basis for trial counsel to
not hire an expert, and even if such an expert would testify in Defendant's favor,
Defendant's claim would still fail for lack of prejudice. Contrary to Defendant's
assertion, this case did not "hinge[] entirely on witness's identifications." Aplt.
Br. at 11. Where the jury had the surveillance video clips and stills, no amount
of testimony on the vagaries of eyewitness identification would have overcome
the video, the stills, and Defendant's ownership of the getaway car.3 Cf. People v.

3

Contrary to Defendant's claim, State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, 223 P.3d
1103, did not require defense counsel here to call an eyewitness identification
expert. See Aplt. Br. at 14-15. The issue in Clopten was whether trial courts
should admit such testimony if (1) it is a central issue in the case and (2) counsel
requests it. Id. at f f 30-48. Clopten said nothing about a defense attorney being
required to present such testimony in every case. To the contrary, the Clopten
court acknowledged that there might still be cases "where the defense does not
call an eyewitness expert" for good reason. Id. at f 34. This was such a case. See
State v. Willey, 2011 UT App 23,119, 248 P.3d 1014 ("While Clopten certainly
suggests that, in general, it may be wise or even expected in appropriate cases to
present expert testimony on the inherent weaknesses of eyewitness or memory
testimony, . . . it does not go so far as to imply that a failure to do so
presumptively renders counsel ineffective without regard for the circumstances
of a particular case.").
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Foster, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 748, 755 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding no prejudice in
ineffectiveness claim where counsel did not, and apparently could not,
corroborate a "cockamamie" defense); State v. Manwaring, 2011 UT App 443, ^f
41,268 P.3d 201 ("[Although Defendant has a constitutional right to present a
defense, he does not have a right to present an irrelevant defense/'). The same
reasoning applies to the failure to request a Long instruction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted May 15, 2012.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

JiAi^^M
JOHN J. NIELSEN

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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